How beliefs are like colors by Curry, Devin Sanchez
Please cite published version 
 
1 
How Beliefs are like Colors 
Devin Sanchez Curry 
Forthcoming in Synthese 
 
Abstract: Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have 
led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double 
dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—
and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive 
systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to 
refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states of belief. I suggest that 
interpretivism provides an attractive account of the former (insofar as they are not conflated with the latter). 
Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent work has cast renewed doubt on the widespread assumption that ordinary folks 
construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior (Hutto 2011; Tanney 2013; Strand & 
Lizardo 2015; Dewhurst 2017; Curry 2018; Almagro Holgado & Fernández Castro 2020; Poslajko 
2020). This doubt opens the door for a working distinction between what I will call ‘attitudes of 
belief’—the beliefs that lay people attribute to each other (and other animals) in everyday life—
and ‘cognitive states of belief’—the beliefs that (some) cognitive scientists posit as cogs in 
cognitive machines.1 In this article, I will exploit an analogy between belief and color to present 
a cascading series of arguments for the conclusion that theorists ought not conflate attitudes of 
belief with cognitive states of belief (pitched at neurophysiological, subpersonal, personal, or 
etiological levels of psychological explanation). I will also suggest that refraining from conflating 
attitudes of belief with cognitive states of belief should lead previously reticent philosophers—
including identity theorists, psychofunctionalists, commonsense functionalists, etiological 
teleofunctionalists, eliminativists, and agnostics about the nature of cognitive states of belief—to 
seriously consider dispositionalism (Ryle 1949; Baker 1995; Schwitzgebel 2002) and especially 
interpretivism (Dennett 1998; Davidson 2001; Mölder 2010; Curry 2020) about the nature of 
attitudes of belief. 
 
1 I use the term of art ‘attitudes’ broadly, following the tradition of Donald Davidson (1963) and Eric 
Schwitzgebel, to mean “a temporary or habitual posture of the mind” (Schwitzgebel 2013: 76) that is 
attributed in folk psychological practices. I do not mean to imply by the use of the term ‘attitude’ that beliefs 
are attitudes towards propositions; I’m more sympathetic with the claim that they are attitudes towards 
the world (Sommers 2009). 
I use the term ‘cognitive’, in ‘cognitive states’, similarly broadly, to mean ‘relating to cognition’, where 
cognition is assumed to be constituted by mental (or neural) states (or processes) that cognitive scientists 
describe in terms of how they contribute to the functioning of the organism who possesses them. Thus, 
cognitive states (theoretically) occur at neurophysiological, subpersonal, personal, and etiological levels of 
psychological explanation, since cognitive scientists describe mental/neural states/processes as 
contributing to the functioning of organisms at each of these levels of explanation. 
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In §2, I will review the case that colors are neither illusory nor intrinsic physical or 
dispositional properties of objects. (By the term ‘intrinsic’ I just mean ‘ontologically non-
relational’—that is, existing independently of their relation to external perceivers or interpreters.) 
In §3, I will argue that attitudes of belief are, likewise, neither figments of the folk psychological 
imagination nor intrinsic physical or dispositional properties of objects. Instead, attitudes of belief 
are properties organisms have partly in virtue of inhabiting the environments of belief attributors. 
As such, they ought not be conflated with intrinsic cognitive states of belief—properties 
organisms are purported to have solely in virtue of their cognitive architecture. In §4, I will argue 
that insofar as teleofunctionalism helps theorists get a grip on the nature of belief, it should be 
recruited to support (rather than collapse) the distinction between attitudes and cognitive states. 
Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems. 
There would be no believers—no creatures properly characterized as having attitudes of belief—
without belief attributors—creatures who characterize creatures as having attitudes of belief. In 
§5, I will conclude by considering the more radical view that cognitive states of belief, too, emerge 
relative to belief attributors. 
 
2. Color 
Reflection on the metaphysics of color provides an impetus to recognize that attitudes of 
belief and cognitive states of belief ought to be conceptually distinguished. 
 
2.1. Against conflating perceivable colors with surface spectral reflectance profiles 
To see why, consider a well-known problem for the view about perceivable color known 
as ‘physicalism’. Physicalists type-identify perceivable colors with intrinsic properties of colored 
objects (Smart 1961; Hilbert 1987), just as most philosophers of mind type-identify attitudes of 
belief with intrinsic cognitive states of belief (Churchland 1981; Fodor 1987; Porot & Mandelbaum 
2021). In particular, most physicalists identify colors with either surface spectral reflectance 
profiles (henceforth SSRs) or the intrinsic physical properties of objects that realize SSRs. Surfaces 
absorb some light at each wavelength of the visible spectrum and reflect the rest. To have an SSR 
is to be disposed to reflect a particular percentage of light at each wavelength on the spectrum. 
Physicalists declare, rightly, that SSRs are the nonrelational dispositional properties of objects 
most closely associated with their colors. (For example, red objects are disposed to reflect more 
light in the longer wavelengths than blue objects.) By extension, the physical properties 
underlying SSRs are the intrinsic physical properties of objects most closely associated with their 
colors. Nevertheless, identifying colors with SSRs (or their physical realizers) is problematic 
because there is a double dissociation between the SSRs of objects and the perceived colors of 
those same objects. 
First, perceived colors of objects do not perfectly track SSRs. Cases of metamerism reveal 
that objects with divergent SSRs often appear identically colored to a single perceiver in a single 
context. There is no principled way to settle on one metamer’s SSR as uniquely veridically 
captured by the shared perceived color (Hatfield 1992). Likewise, there is no good reason to 
suppose that only one metamer is really the color it appears to be. Thus, perceived colors are 
multiply realized by SSRs. 
Nor does the SSR of an object fix its perceived color. Cases of intrasubjective perceptual 
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variation reveal that objects with identical SSRs appear differently colored due to context, even 
when perceived simultaneously by a single perceiver (Cohen 2009: 20). Moreover, the perceived 
colors of objects vary between perceivers even when the context is held constant. A particularly 
stark—if atypical—example of this phenomenon known as ‘The Dress’ went viral on the internet 
in the 2010s. The Dress is an image of a backlit, striped article of clothing. About 60% of people 
see The Dress’s stripes as alternating white and gold; about 30% see the same stripes as blue and 
black. Only about 1% of people report being able to (intentionally or unintentionally) switch 
between the two commonly perceived color configurations (Wallisch 2017: 4). The Dress is thus 
a clear case of intersubjective variation in perceived color. 
Now, this stark difference in how the world is colored for different human perceivers rests 
on a knife’s edge. In most viewing conditions, there is approximate—though not absolute—
intersubjective uniformity in perceived color among non-color-blind human perceivers. In 
normal daylight, the article of clothing photographed for the viral image—'the dress’ with a 
lower-case ‘d’—looks blue and black to nearly all humans (including those who see the image of 
The Dress as white and gold). Importantly, though, there remain subtle differences in the exact 
shades of blue and black experienced by different individuals (Webster 2015). Due to normal 
variation in human perceptual systems, even in normal daylight I likely see the dress as either a 
slightly redder or slightly greener shade of blue than you. And whether the dress’s blue is really 
redder or greener is not settled by reference to the dress’s SSR.2 
There is almost certainly more dramatic variance between perceivers of different species. 
Animals with one or two types of cone cell almost certainly see a differently colored world than 
trichromatic humans. The same goes for many fellow trichromats; red mason bees detect shorter-
wavelength ‘ultraviolet’ light but not longer-wavelength ‘red’ light, whereas humans detect ‘red’ 
light but not ‘ultraviolet’ light. Crocuses which look purple to humans likely look yellowish to 
bees (Menzel et al. 1988). 
These cases of intrasubjective, intersubjective, and interspecific perceptual variation 
reveal that the SSR of an object does not fix its perceived color. In most situations, most perceivers 
of the same species will have approximately intersubjectively uniform color experiences. 
However, there are always subtle differences in perceived color, and these differences grow less 
subtle as perceivers cross species boundaries or enter unusual viewing conditions. Sometimes—
as with The Dress, which led to newsworthy amounts of bickering on social media—the 
differences are stark enough to be practically significant. But the argument for dissociating colors 
and SSRs need not rely on such dramatic examples (which can be facilely dismissed as illusory). 
Even with respect to subtle—but ubiquitous—individual differences in color perception, there is 
no principled way to settle on one perceived color as the veridical representation of the SSR in 
question, much less as the true color of the object itself. 
 
2 Empirical research indicates that subjects’ expectations about illumination conditions—and attendant 
modulation of color constancy mechanisms—drive the differential perceived colors The Dress exhibits due 
to the ambiguous illuminance conditions presented by the backlighting in the image (Wallisch 2017). In 
normal daylight viewing conditions, there is not much ambiguity in illuminance, so there is not much 
ambiguity in perceived color. Other researchers have offered (less convincing) explanations of the 
phenomenon in terms of differential macular pigment optical density (Rabin et al. 2016) or the top-down 
influence of knowledge of the color of the dress in normal illuminance conditions (Schlaffke 2015). 
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Philosophers have responded to the double dissociation between perceivable colors and 
the physical properties of colored objects in several ways. Physicalists and primitivists (Yablo 
1995; Gert 2017) insist that each reflective surface has one true perceivable color (or set of colors), 
and that all others are illusory. For example, physicalists and primitivists might agree that 
metamers are really distinctly colored (no matter the lighting), that The Dress is really blue and 
black (even for bees), and that crocus petals are devoid of yellow. Idealists claim that there is no 
such thing as veridical color perception, because colors are perceptual figments (Jackson 1977). 
Irrealists claim that there is no such property as color (Hardin 1988; Boghossian & Velleman 1989). 
 
2.2  Color relationalism 
Relationalists (Thompson 1995; Hatfield 2009; Cohen 2009; Chirimuuta 2015) hold that 
colors are neither arbitrary intrinsic properties of objects, subjective sense data, nor illusions. 
Instead, relationalists respond to the double dissociation between perceived colors and SSRs by 
arguing that colors are constituted by the relationship between color perceivers and the 
dispositional properties of environmentally embedded objects. Evan Thompson, for example, 
writes that “being colored a particular determinate color or shade is equivalent to having a 
particular spectral reflectance, illuminance, or emittance that looks that color to a particular 
perceiver in specific viewing conditions” (1995: 245). Thompson thus responds by selectively 
grounding colors in SSRs that bear the right sort of relationship to color perceivers. In particular, 
colors are realized by those SSRs that enable perceivers to have color experiences. On this 
relationalist picture, single SSRs sometimes non-arbitrarily realize different colors because they 
enable different perceivers to see different colors (or single perceivers to see different colors in 
different contexts). Likewise, different SSRs sometimes non-arbitrarily realize a single color 
because they both enable perceivers to see that color. 
Like Thompson, Gary Hatfield emphasizes the biological and psychological roles of color. 
 
Not every property is a physical property. The property of being nutritious is not. Neither 
is color. They are both biofunctional properties. Color, as a property defined in relation to 
phenomenal experience or psychological discriminatory capacities, is a psychobiological 
property. As such, its basis may be found in the relation of subjects to objects. (2009: 296) 
 
To be nutritious is to be usable in metabolism. The physicochemical properties of any given 
object, taken by themselves, do not render it intrinsically usable in metabolism. Nothing is non-
relationally nutritious; things are only nutritious for organisms. Of course, being nutritious for 
any particular organism is nothing more than a matter of having the appropriate physical and 
chemical properties. But what makes those physicochemical properties appropriate is their 
metabolizability by that organism. Wood is nutritious for termites but not for humans, and 
peaches are nutritious for humans but not for termites. Analogously, to be colored is to be 
perceivable as colored. The physicochemical properties of any given object, taken by themselves, 
do not render it perceivable as colored. Things are only colored for organisms. Again, being 
colored any particular hue for any particular organism is nothing more than a matter of having 
appropriate physicochemical properties. But what makes those physicochemical properties 
appropriate is the fact that they allow that organism to perceive that color. Oranges are orange 
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for (most) humans, but they are not necessarily orange for other trichromats, much less for 
dichromats. 
Nutritiousness and color are quintessentially ecological properties: there is no nutritious 
wood except in the environments of woodeaters like termites, and there are no colored objects 
except in the environments of color perceivers. Humans likely evolved trichromatic color vision 
partly to distinguish fruits from leaves (Mollon 1989; Jacobs 1996; Regan et al 2001). On this 
hypothesis, the perceivable colors raspberry red and leaf green evolved in tandem with the 
perceptual capacity of humans to discriminate between how the surfaces of raspberries and 
leaves respectively reflect light. In sum, color, realized by SSRs in relation to perceptual systems, 
is the ecological property that functions to enable organisms to visually discriminate 
environmental objects by hue. 
While color relationalists tend to advocate relationalism as an alternative to physicalism 
about color, it would be perfectly coherent for them to embrace both, as accounts of distinct 
phenomena. A distinction can be drawn between the colors that organisms perceive and the 
intrinsic properties of objects that physicists might reasonably label ‘colors’. Relationalism might 
be true of color qua perceivable property of objects—the ‘color’ phenomenon of interest in 
perceptual psychology—while physicalism is true of color qua intrinsic property of objects—the 
‘color’ phenomenon of interest in the physics of light.  
Relationalists need not take a stance on the issue of whether SSRs resemble (or correspond 
to) perceivable colors sufficiently to count as the intrinsic colors of physical objects. Instead, they 
can point to the double dissociation between SSRs and perceivable colors as reason to reject 
physicalism and embrace relationalism as an account of perceivable color. Perceivable colors are 
ecological properties relativized to particular perceivers and particular viewing conditions, 
whether or not SSRs (or their physico-chemical realizers) deserve to be labeled ‘intrinsic colors’ 
in their own right. 
The rest of this article will draw from the argument for a relationalist view of color that I 
have just sketched in order to resist the conflation of attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive 
states of belief. Attitudes of belief are ecological properties, just like perceivable colors. Just as 
perceivable colors are realized by SSRs that function to make objects look colored to color 
perceivers, attitudes of belief are realized by dispositions to act, react, think, and feel that, taken 
together, function to render people believers in the eyes of belief attributors. And I will argue that, 
just as even committed physicalists about intrinsic colors ought also to accept relationalism about 
perceivable colors, even those philosophers who are committed to the existence of cognitive states 
of belief qua intrinsic features of organisms ought also to accept a relationalist account of attitudes 
of belief.3 
 
3 My argument for and account of attitudes of belief—while usefully illustrated by analogy with the 
argument for relationalism about color—does not stand or fall with any particular metaphysics of color. 
Like all analogies, the analogy between belief and color is imperfect and incomplete. Most strikingly, 
organisms see colors. Following Shannon Spaulding (2015), I reject views according to which belief 
attributors literally perceive beliefs. In some ways, this point of disanalogy renders the metaphysics of 
attitudes of belief easier to pin down than the metaphysics of perceivable colors. Embracing belief 
attribution as a thoroughly cognitive (as opposed to perceptual) phenomenon enables us to ignore tricky 
questions about the cognitive penetration of perception. It also enables model-theoretic accounts of belief 




There is a problem for views that conflate attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states 
of belief that parallels the problem for physicalism about perceivable color. The primary 
candidates for cognitive states of belief are brain states, subpersonal computational states, and 
personal functional states. But there are double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the 
beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and all three of these candidates for 
intrinsic cognitive states of belief, which mirror the double dissociation between perceivable 
colors and SSRs.4 (Going forward, I will use Gilbert Ryle’s label ‘paramechanical’ (1949) to pick 
out views which conflate attitudes with cognitive states.) 
 
3.1. Against conflating attitudes with brain states 
Paramechanical identity theorists type-identify attitudes of belief with brain processes, 
holding that beliefs “just are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes” (Smart 
2007: 1).5 Unfortunately for paramechanical identity theorists, there is a much-rehearsed double 
dissociation between attitudes of beliefs and the relevant neural processes and states of believers. 
First, just as perceived colors are multiply realizable by SSRs, attitudes of belief are multiply 
realizable by brain states (Putnam 1967). Second, on the least controversial of externalist 
assumptions, indistinguishable brain states can underlie distinct attitudes of belief when 
embedded in distinct environments (Putnam 1975).  
The classic arguments for both multiple realizability and externalism hinge on the 
plausible claim that folk psychological belief attribution practices do not perfectly track 
neurophysiological similarities and differences. Insofar as these classic arguments hold water, the 
double dissociation arising therefrom indicates that attitudes of belief ought not be conflated with 
brain states. Insofar as the identity theory is the best metaphysics of cognitive states of belief—and 
a recent revival provides good reason to think it may be (Shapiro 2018; Thomson & Piccinini 
2018)—we ought not conflate attitudes with cognitive states. 
Paramechanists have responded to this double dissociation between attitudes of belief 
and brain states in several ways. Identity theorists downplay multiple realization and either deny 
 
attribution (Godfrey-Smith 2005; Maibom 2009; Spaulding 2018; Curry forthcoming b), according to which 
interpreters construct and wield model psychological profiles of people in order to ascribe attitudes (and 
other traits) to those people. Model psychological profiles are more theoretically and empirically tractable 
than the amodal perceptual processes posited by theorists who countenance mindseeing. A related point 
of disanalogy stems from the impact that cultural forces have on models of belief. Culture may affect color 
perceptual learning (Connolly 2017), but models of belief are much more culturally variable (Heyes & Frith 
2014; Lavelle 2019; Curry 2020). Likewise, belief attributors can construct models of new beliefs on the fly 
(Curry forthcoming a), whereas color perceivers cannot learn to perceive new colors. 
4 These dissociations have a cascading structure: although computationalism dodges the arguments against 
identity theory, and pure functionalism dodges the arguments against computationalism, the arguments 
against (paramechanical) pure functionalism also condemn (paramechanical) computationalism and the 
arguments against (paramechanical) computationalism also condemn (paramechanical) identity theory. 
Given this cascading structure, I will give more space to the later (more comprehensive) arguments. 
5 Unlike Smart, U.T. Place (1956) developed his pioneering version of the identity theory about 
consciousness as a supplement to his staunchly anti-paramechanical Rylean view of belief. 
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externalism or broaden the relevant physical states to include features of the environment. 
Dualists pull apart the physical and mental domains. Eliminativists deny that beliefs exist. 
However, by far the most popular way to respond to the double dissociation is to adopt 
paramechanical functionalism about belief. Paramechanical functionalism encompasses a diverse 
family of views which all hold that beliefs are individuated with respect to the functional roles 
they play in cognitive systems. 
 
3.2. Against conflating attitudes with subpersonal computational states 
Put overly simply, cognitive systems receive perceptual inputs and emit behavioral and 
experiential outputs. Computational functionalism is the doctrine that beliefs are functionally 
characterized subpersonal states: cogs that help cognitive machines transition from inputs to 
outputs.6 According to one popular version of computational functionalism, beliefs are 
subpersonal relations to mental representations that play the psychofunctional role of disposing 
the believer to act as if the world were a particular way (Fodor 1987; Porot & Mandelbaum 2021). 
Computational functionalists embrace the multiple realizability of beliefs by brain states. 
For the functionalist, brain states can multiply realize attitudes of belief because what makes a 
brain state realize a belief is a matter of cognitive function rather than physiology. Many 
computational functionalists are also happy to individuate cognitive states with respect to the 
external environment (Harman 1987; Block 1990; Kitcher 1991). Many computational 
functionalisms thus elegantly dodge the double dissociation between brain states and attitudes 
of belief, while reaffirming the conflation of attitudes of belief with cognitive states of belief. 
Nevertheless, paramechanical computational functionalists must reckon with a double 
dissociation of their own.  
First, attitudes of belief are multiply realized by subpersonal computational states, just as 
computational states are multiply realized by brain states. As Hilary Putnam forcefully put the 
point, “there is absolutely no reason to believe that there is one computational state that all 
possible human beings who think that “there are lots of cats in the neighborhood” must be in” 
(1988: 104). Consider three people who all share the attitude of belief that a mug contains hot 
coffee. While her conscious mind is preoccupied with work, a distracted Delia orders a “dark 
roast for here” from Mo, the barista at her local café, and instinctively tells her three-year-old son, 
Roger, to “watch out; Mommy’s coffee is very hot.” Pouring the coffee, Mo the barista 
subpersonally computationally represents a 196°F French Roast made from Guatemalan beans 
being poured into a stoneware mug made by a local potter. Delia’s relevant subpersonal 
representations are comparatively impoverished; she computes a dark roast coffee that she 
remembers liking the taste of, being poured into a nice mug, steaming enough that she should 
warn Roger. For his part, Roger, who has been raised alongside his mom’s coffee habit, takes 
‘mug’ to refer to any drinking vessel whatsoever, has no clue that there are different kinds of 
 
6 ‘Computational functionalisms’, as I use the term, include machine state functionalism, most classic forms 
of psychofunctionalism, and many embodied/embedded/extended/enactive/etc. functionalisms that 
complicate the simplistic input-computation-output functional analysis but retain some commitment to 
mental states intervening between perception and action. Computational functionalism is, however, to be 
distinguished from pure functionalism and teleofunctionalism, which I discuss in §§3.3 and 4. 
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coffee, and wields only a rough conception of degrees of heat.  
Mo, Delia, and Roger all share the attitude of belief that there is hot coffee in the mug—
that is, lay attributions of this belief to each of them would be veridical. But the functionally 
individuated computational states that underlie their respective beliefs diverge sharply, in terms 
of both representational content and psychofunctional role. Roger’s notions of ‘mug’ and ‘coffee’ 
and ‘hot’ are different than Delia’s, though not so different that it results in them having a 
different belief in this context.7 Moreover, Roger’s subpersonal computations over 
representations of the coffee and mug transform different inputs into different outputs than his 
mom’s richer representations, and Mo’s still richer representations transform still different inputs 
into different outputs. For example, Mo alone is prone to feel proud that the coffee is the optimal 
temperature for this particular Guatemalan French Roast, and Roger alone is prone to infer that 
every mug, cup, and glass in the café is a mug practically brimming over with scary hot coffee. 
The three café denizens’ subpersonal computational states multiply realize their shared attitude 
of belief.8 
The case for the multiple realization of attitudes of belief by subpersonal computational 
states is strengthened by cross-species comparisons. As Kim Sterelny (1990a; 1990b) argues, 
animals of different species often subpersonally realize (what can be fruitfully categorized as) the 
same attitudes via distinct computational states. 
 
Consider just the difference in perceptual structures between bats and owls. Owls have 
notoriously acute night vision, whereas bats find their way around by echo location. So if 
we had reason to attribute to bats and owls the same psychological state—say that they 
both perceive mice—then that state could hardly be individualistically defined. 
Perceptual systems vary greatly; their only common feature is that their function is the 
extraction of information for the adaptive control of behavior. (Sterelny 1990b: 98) 
 
A bat and an owl can also share the attitude of believing there is a mouse in the grass, despite 
great variance in the computational states underlying the creatures’ respective beliefs. There is 
no principled way of picking the bat or owl’s (or forest ranger’s) subpersonal relations to mental 
representations as the proper computational state to realize the belief that there is a mouse in the 
grass. 
 Second, attitudes of belief exhibit a unity (Curry forthcoming a) which may not exist 
among the computational states that subpersonally realize them. Consider my attitude of belief 
that I can help myself to La Colombe coffee from the Center for Neuroscience & Society lounge 
 
7 A thoroughgoing externalist might deny this difference in representational content (Burge 2010; Fodor & 
Pylyshyn 2016). I prefer externalisms which allow for internal factors that cause differences in content 
between mental representations with the same referent. Regardless, the claim that Mo, Delia, and Roger’s 
mental representations have different content is not required to dissociate attitudes of belief from 
computational states: as explained in the next sentence of the main text, differences in psychofunctional 
roles—or in what Fodor calls “the syntactic structure of modes of presentation” (1992: 54), if you go in for 
that kind of thing—do the trick. 
8 Ryle (1949), Dennett (1978), Pylyshyn (1980; 1984), Putnam (1988), Schwitzgebel (2018), and myself (Curry 
forthcoming a) discuss similar cases. 
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on weekday mornings. This belief is concrete, specific, and coherent, but its cognitive 
underpinnings are complex. Believing it requires a cognitive system boasting a conjunct of 
functionally independent computational relations to mental representations, including 
representations of coffee and the company La Colombe and freeness of charge and permission 
and weekday mornings and my capacity to fetch things, as well a mental map of how to get to 
the relevant lounge.  
There is unity in my attitude of belief—I live as if I can help myself to La Colombe from 
the Center for Neuroscience & Society lounge on weekday mornings in a unified pattern—but 
this unity plausibly emerges from disunity at the subpersonal level of computational states. 
Psychofunctional relations to my mental representation of weekday mornings are only 
peripherally associated with psychofunctional relations to my mental representation of freeness 
of charge. It is dubious that an explanatorily fecund cognitive architecture would (nonarbitrarily) 
tie these functionally independent computational states together as components of a single, 
functionally unified subpersonal cognitive state of belief. The only reason to tie them together 
would be that they both underlie an attitude of belief. But, on pain of begging the question of 
whether to conflate attitudes with cognitive states, that attitude of belief should not be conflated 
with a conjunction of computational states that are disunified at the subpersonal level. The 
paramechanist thus has no grounds for denying that the whole emergent pattern is more than the 
sum of its computational realizers.9  
Indeed, the two prongs of the double dissociation between attitudes of belief and 
computational realizers are mutually reinforcing. If two different believers can share an emergent 
pattern despite differing in its computational realizers, then that pattern must be more than the 
sum of its parts. And if emergent patterns are what are of interest in everyday belief attribution, 
then there is no prima facie reason to doubt—and some additional reason to approbate—the extant 
evidence of multiple realization. 
 Especially in light of reasons to doubt that the folk construe beliefs as productive inner 
causes (Curry 2018), the multiple realization of attitudes of belief by (functionally disunified 
conjunctions of) subpersonal states should be enough to convince theorists to refrain from 
conflating attitudes with their computational realizers. And it has so convinced some 
paramechanists. Sterelny, for example, avoids the double dissociation between attitudes of belief 
and subpersonal computational states by instead conflating attitudes of belief with cognitive 
states of belief that play functional roles at the personal level of explanation. For high-level 
paramechanical functionalists like Sterelny, the bat, owl, and forest ranger can all be said to 
believe that there is a mouse in the grass insofar as they are disposed to behave, think, and feel in 
patterns that function to track the existence of the mouse in the grass. Paramechanists like 
Sterelny require that “the animals in question have certain discriminatory, memory or calculative 
abilities [to qualify as believers], but don’t care [for the purpose of high-level belief attribution] 
how those abilities are computationally realized” (1990b: 99). 
 
 
9 Matthews (2007: 241) gives a very similar argument for the conclusion that attitudes must be personal 
(rather than subpersonal) phenomena, though (like Sterelny, as well as Jackson and Pettit, as discussed 
below) he goes in for a paramechanical view which conflates attitudes with personal functional states. 
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3.3. Against conflating attitudes with personal functional states 
 Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit call this a “purely functional theory”, since it says that “to 
have beliefs and desires is to be understood purely functionally” (1990: 43): as having no relevant 
features over and above (or under and below) delivering certain outputs in response to certain 
inputs. Like Sterelny, Jackson and Pettit stress that the relevant functional roles mediating 
between inputs and outputs are not subpersonal psychofunctional roles of the sort that 
differentiate owls, bats, and forest rangers (1990: 34, 37). Instead, they are personal patterns of 
dispositions described at an abstract enough level to subsume the ways in which owls, bats, and 
forest rangers function to represent their environments. It does not matter whether disunified 
conjuncts of computational states multiply realize these abstractly characterized and purely 
functionally individuated beliefs; “it does not matter for the success of our passage back and forth 
between situations, behavior, beliefs, and desires how many states inside the agent are required 
to work the trick” (41). Insofar as agents do successfully work the trick—do go from inputs to 
outputs in patterns reliably identifiable as believing—those agents are believers.  
On this (purportedly) purely functional person-level conception of cognitive states of 
belief, Mo, Delia, and Roger share the cognitive state of belief that there is hot coffee in the mug, 
and there is functional unity to my cognitive state of belief that I can help myself to La Colombe 
coffee from the neuroscience lounge on weekday mornings. Moreover, as Jackson and Pettit 
argue, it is difficult to deny that such personal functionally individuated beliefs exist. 
The problem with Jackson and Pettit’s view stems from the fact that, contra their rhetoric, 
there is no such thing as a purely functional analysis of agents, devoid of a principled criterion 
which determines which mediations between inputs and outputs are functionally relevant. In 
other words, the person-level functionalist must provide a criterion that fixes which of a believers’ 
countless dispositions constitute any given belief; something has to explain why Delia’s 
disposition to blow softly into her mug—but not her disposition to sneeze when placing her mug 
next to a vase of daisies—is partly constitutive of Delia functioning to represent the mug as 
containing hot coffee. 
The diverse styles in which believers play person-level functional roles put this problem 
in high relief. The echolocating bat and sharp-eyed owl are disposed to transform different inputs 
into different outputs, yet their divergent dispositions functionally realize the same belief. 
Intraspecifically, Mo, Delia, and Roger possess different personal dispositions as well as different 
subpersonal computational states. Their divergent dispositions functionally realize the same 
belief, but they do not purely functionally realize the same belief. The aspiring person-level 
functionalist must give a criterion that non-arbitrarily lumps together Mo, Delia, and Roger’s 
distinctly stylized patterns of living as fulfilling the same function for the respective believers. 
Any of three candidate criteria would serve to explain what makes divergent patterns of 
dispositions all fulfill a particular person-level functional role, and thereby count as the same 
belief. First, divergent patterns of dispositions might stem from the same subpersonal 
computational state (or set of computational states). In that case, personal paramechanical 
functionalism collapses into subpersonal paramechanical functionalism, and faces the attendant 
double dissociation between attitudes of belief and cognitive states of belief. Second, divergent 
patterns of dispositions might serve the same irreducibly normative ecological purpose. Sterelny 
opts for this second, teleofunctional criterion. In §4, I will argue that teleofunctionalists have 
Please cite published version 
 
11 
further reason to refuse to conflate attitudes of belief with cognitive states of belief. Third, 
divergent patterns of dispositions might all sufficiently fit interpreters’ models of belief or 
practices of belief attribution. Jackson and Pettit (belying the purported purity of their 
functionalism) opt for a paramechanical version of this third, commonsense criterion, arguing 
that “it is sufficient for having beliefs and desires that one be in states which satisfy the functional 
roles embodied in our everyday practice of predicting and explaining human behavior (for short, 
the folk roles)” (1990: 36). 
Taking folk practices of belief attribution to supply the criteria that individuate beliefs 
does not make Jackson and Pettit interpretivists. On the contrary, Jackson and Pettit hold that 
“folk psychology is a theory” about purely functional person-level cognitive states that exist 
independently of practices of belief attribution (1990: 33). People have myriad cognitive states 
that nomically mediate between inputs and outputs. On Jackson and Pettit’s view, folk 
psychology simply determines which independently existing cognitive states—which lawlike 
mediations between inputs and outputs—are captured by the commonsense theoretical positing 
of ‘beliefs’. They embrace the paramechanical conclusion that attitudes of belief are just personal 
functionally individuated cognitive states that folk belief attributors designate ‘beliefs’. 
Unfortunately for paramechanical commonsense functionalists like Jackson and Pettit, 
there is a final double dissociation between attitudes of belief and the person-level functional 
states picked out by practices of belief attribution. Just as SSRs—surface-level functional states of 
objects—multiply realize perceivable colors in cases of metamerism, personal functional states 
multiply realize attitudes of belief. And just as the perceived colors of objects (but not SSRs) vary 
between perceivers, attitudes of belief (but not personal functional states) vary between 
attributors. 
First, Jackson and Pettit’s commonsense paramechanical functionalism fails to make the 
case that Mo, Delia, and Roger share a cognitive state of belief. The three café denizens have the 
same attitude of belief, as they are all in states which satisfy the folk role played by the attitude 
of believing there is coffee in the cup. According to Jackson and Pettitian commonsense 
functionalism, the three also share a cognitive state of belief constituted by whatever personal 
dispositions happen to mediate between inputs and outputs such that they function in the way 
theoretically posited by the folk role. But Mo, Delia, and Roger do not share the same cognitive 
state of belief; on the contrary, they share an attitude of belief despite having different stylized 
person-level functional configurations, just like metamers share a color despite boasting different 
SSRs.10 
Attitudes of belief are individuated based on belief attributors’ models or practices, 
whereas cognitive states of belief are individuated within the functional structure of believers. 
Jackson and Pettit (1990: 40–43) make a plausible (if not decisive) case that the predictive and 
explanatory success of attributions of attitudes of belief guarantees that people have cognitive 
states of belief—that ascriptions of attitudes of belief track some way or other in which believers 
are functionally configured. But there is no guarantee that all ascriptions of any given attitude 
track the same functional configuration. On the contrary, personal functional states multiply 
realize attitudes of belief. Mo, Delia, and Roger share an attitude despite having dramatically 
 
10 I provide more examples (and analysis) of diverse styles of belief elsewhere (Curry forthcoming a). 
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different dispositions. There is no principled way of picking Mo, Delia, or Roger’s purely 
functional state as the proper personal functional state that is veridically captured by an ascription 
of attitude of belief. 
Nor does the functional configuration of a believer fix which attitudes of belief she 
possesses. As I have argued at greater length elsewhere (Curry 2020), in some contexts it is 
intersubjectively indeterminate what somebody believes, just as the colors of The Dress are 
intersubjectively indeterminate. A single personal functional configuration sometimes underlies 
different attitudes of belief for different belief attributors. In such cases, the believer believes one 
thing for one belief attributor and another thing for another belief attributor, just as The Dress is 
white and gold for one color perceiver and blue and black for another color perceiver. There is no 
principled way of settling on one of these attitudes as the believer’s one true belief. 
Consider a variation on Daniel Dennett’s (1998: 115) vignette about Ella, who has been 
behaving in troubling, self-undermining ways. Brown interprets Ella as believing that she ought 
to kill herself; Jones interprets Ella as believing, despite her angst, that she ought not kill herself. 
By stipulation, Brown and Jones have access to the full range of Ella’s dispositions to act, react, 
think, and feel. Even so, they disagree. What Ella believes is intersubjectively indeterminate. 
To flesh out the case, suppose Ella’s most relevant dispositions are threefold: she feels no 
joy, it regularly occurs to her that she is capable of killing herself, she says she wants to die. Now 
suppose that Brown and Jones have developed different interpretive strategies—and attendant 
models of belief—over the course of their lives. Through his amateur study of human psychology 
and 19th century debates about natural selection, Jones has developed the deep conviction that 
people never believe they should kill themselves. Jones is convinced that evolutionary pressures 
have rendered people psychologically incapable of believing that they should end their own lives, 
though he allows that people sometimes mistake other beliefs—such as the belief that they would 
go to great lengths to escape their depression—for the belief that they ought to kill themselves. 
Jones models Ella as being confused about what she believes (and worries that she might act on 
the basis of that confusion) but does not model Ella as believing she ought to kill herself.11 Brown, 
by contrast, interprets people as believing their assertions, absent probative evidence to the 
contrary, and holds that some people have genuine suicidal beliefs. 
Jones voluminously and reliably predicts behaviors, thoughts, and feelings in accordance 
with his pet psychological theory (just look at how many people unsuccessfully attempt suicide, 
due to the lack of conviction with which they act!). Brown voluminously and reliably predicts 
 
11 Jones’s may be a deeply flawed way of thinking about people’s motivations. By stipulation, it is a 
predictively powerful interpretive strategy. (Jones predicts whether or not people will kill themselves with 
as much accuracy as Brown; he just does not use the attribution of belief that one ought to kill themselves 
in order to get to that prediction.) But perhaps it fails to capture what actually motivates people to act. 
However, whether Jones is a nonideal social cognizer is beside the point. Insofar as attitudes of belief are 
determined by folk models of belief—as Jackson and Pettit readily admit—they are determined by the 
nonideal, messy ways in which belief attributors actually model beliefs. Compare: humans may be deeply 
flawed color perceivers. We fail to represent whole chunks of the spectrum! But that humans are nonideal 
color perceivers is beside the point, when it comes to the metaphysics of perceivable colors. Perceivable 
colors are determined by the nonideal, messy visual spectrum, as it manifests itself in relation to particular 
nonideal color perceivers. 
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behaviors, thoughts, and feelings in accordance with his no-bullshit ethos. Ella believes she ought 
not kill herself from Jones’s point of view, while believing that she ought to kill herself from 
Brown’s point of view. Jones and Brown attribute different attitudes of belief despite agreeing on 
Ella’s personal functional states. 
What does Ella believe, really? Well, what color is The Dress, really? (If your kneejerk 
reaction is “it is really blue and black, just look at the dress in normal daylight viewing 
conditions!”, what precise shades of blue and black is it? And is it really blue and black for bees 
as well as humans?) These questions are insufficiently precise. Ella believes different things—and 
believes things differently—for different belief attributors. The Dress is blue and black for 30% of 
the population and white and gold for 60% of the population. (The Dress is a special case, but 
even in normal daylight the dress is a different shade of blue for different color perceivers. And 
crocuses are different colors for different animals.) Everybody is right. The Dress really is white 
and gold for me, and it really is blue and black for people who see it as blue and black.12 Likewise, 
Ella really believes she ought not kill herself for Jones, while really believing she ought to kill 
herself for Brown.  
Complete knowledge of Ella’s dispositions does not suffice to decide between these two 
interpretations, any more than knowledge of the dress’s SSR suffices to decide its precise shade 
of perceivable blue. Ella has a single, intersubjectively stable set of dispositions to act, react, think, 
and feel, but she has different attitudes of belief for Brown and Jones, respectively. There is no 
principled way to settle on one of these attitudes of belief as the veridical representation of Ella’s 
personal functional state, much less as Ella’s one true belief. 
As with color perception, there is interspecific as well as interpersonal indeterminacy in 
attitude attribution. Objects do not have the same perceivable colors for dichromats as for 
trichromats. Analogously, believers do not have the same attitudes for nonhuman attitude 
attributors as for humans. According to the currently mainstream interpretation of the empirical 
evidence on chimpanzee social cognitive capacities, chimps attribute goals, intentions, 
perception, knowledge, and ignorance to other animals, but do not attribute attitudes of belief 
(Call and Tomasello 2008). Even if recent reports that chimps do attribute attitudes of belief have 
merit (Crockford et al. 2012; Krupenye, Kano et al. 2016; Buttelmann et al. 2017), it is unlikely that 
they model beliefs in the same manner as humans. For example, chimps do not model beliefs as 
centrally involving the disposition to assent to linguistically structured propositions.  
This difference in models of belief does not entail that chimps always fall short of 
veridically attributing the beliefs that believers really have. Instead, chimps (like humans) may be 
 
12 As previously noted in footnote 3, readers need not accept this relativism about perceivable colors in 
order to accept the analogous relativism about attitudes of belief. The analogy between belief and color is 
illuminating, but it does not do any argumentative work. Rather, the argument for relativism about belief 
formally mirrors the argument for relativism about color, but one argument may be sound and the other 
unsound due to divergent facts about the respective phenomena of interest. It may be that The Dress is 
really particular determinate shades of blue and black for all humans, even while attitudes of belief are fully 
intersubjectively indeterminate. Elsewhere (Curry 2020), I have argued at length against the ways in which 
other interpretivists have relativized attitudes of belief to intersubjectively determinate normative 
standards (like color relationalists who relativize colors to species-standard perceivers and viewing 
conditions). 
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excellent at attributing the attitudes it serves their species-specific purposes to attribute (Boesch 
& Boesch-Achermann 2000; Boesch 2009; Nagel 2011; Andrews 2018). There may be no 
interspecifically determinate answer to the question ‘what attitudes does Chimpella really have?’, 
just as there is not interspecifically determinate answer to the question ‘what perceivable colors 
does the crocus really have?’ Chimpella really has one set of attitudes of belief for Sally the human, 
and a different set for Red Peter the chimp. But Chimpella does not have an interspecifically 
variable personal functional state of belief. Thus, Chimpella’s attitudes of belief ought not be 
conflated with her cognitive states of belief. 
The reader need not accept this full-on relativism in order to see the problem 
intersubjective indeterminacy presents for conflating attitudes of belief with cognitive states of 
belief. An anti-relativist could, instead, treat intersubjective indeterminacy as grounds for 
irrealism rather than relativistic realism about attitudes of belief. Or else the anti-relativist might 
follow Dennett (1998) in claiming that what Ella believes is objectively (rather than merely 
intersubjectively) indeterminate. Finally, the anti-relativist might follow Donald Davidson (2001), 
Lynne Rudder Baker (1995), and Bruno Mölder (2010) in denying the coherence of the Ella and 
Chimpella cases—indeed, the coherence of intersubjective indeterminacy—on the grounds that 
veridical belief attribution is an irreducibly social, irreducibly normative, and uniquely human 
ability.13 All of these theorists can agree that Jones and Brown (or Sally and Red Peter) attribute 
different attitudes of belief to (Chimp)Ella, and that there are no facts to be uncovered about 
(Chimp)Ella’s personal or subpersonal functional architecture that fix one attribution as the veridical 
attribution.14 Attitudes—if they exist—are metaphysically fixed in relation to interpretive 
capacities (or practices), not solely by personal functional roles, subpersonal computational states, 
or brain states. Moreover, brain states multiply realize computational states, which multiply 
realize pure functional roles, which multiply realize attitudes of belief. Thus, attitudes of belief 
ought not be conflated with intrinsic cognitive states of belief. 
 
3.4. How attitudes of belief are like perceivable colors 
 My solution to the problems facing paramechanical theories of belief mimics the 
relationalist solution to the problem facing physicalist theories of color. Attitudes of belief, like 
 
13 For Davidson, it follows from the irreducibly social nature of belief attribution that if Jones and Brown 
know the same set of facts about Ella, then they cannot rationally disagree about what Ella believes. For 
Baker, Ella believes whatever the common sense interpretation would have her believe. Similarly, for 
Mölder, what Ella believes depends on a canonical ascription, which is partly determined by how ordinary 
people attribute beliefs. Elsewhere (Curry 2020), I have argued against these views and for relativism about 
belief. My present point is that attitudes ought not be conflated with cognitive states if attitudes are 
determined relative to attributors’ models of belief, regardless of whether the veridicality conditions for 
belief attribution are set relativistically, objectively, or intersubjectively. 
14 For attitude irrealists, this is because no lay belief attributions are veridical. For Dennettians, this is 
because there is no objective fact of the matter. For Davidsonians, this is because what fixes the veridical 
attribution is a constitutive norm of interpretation—the principle of charity. For Bakerites, this is because 
what fixes the veridical attribution is what passes for common sense in a linguistic community, and, 
similarly, for Mölderians it is because what fixes the veridical attribution is how ordinary ascribers interpret 
people. 
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perceivable colors, are relational properties. Just as perceivable colors arise from the relationship 
between colored objects and color perceivers, attitudes of belief arise from the relationship 
between believers and belief attributors. In particular, believing is possessing a pattern of 
dispositions that a belief attributor recognizes as a taking of the world to be some way. 
Importantly, it is the pattern of dispositions—which emerges as an attitude of belief only in 
relation to a belief attributor’s model—rather than the functionally individuated dispositions 
themselves, which belief attributors recognize as beliefs. 
 Thus stated, this minimal framework of a view is consistent with a wide range of 
dispositionalisms (Baker 1995; Schwitzgebel 2002) and interpretivisms (Dennett 1998; Davidson 
2001; Mölder 2010) that carry debts to Ryle’s (1949) landmark account of attitudes of belief.15 But 
the analogy with color indicates a novel way of fleshing out a Rylean view. Attitudes of belief are 
ecological properties, like perceivable colors. Beliefs serve functional roles in the environments of 
mindreaders—organisms who attribute beliefs to themselves and others. In particular, attitudes 
of belief are the externalistically individuated patterns of dispositions in virtue of which 
believers—qua objects in social environments—function to seem to believe to belief attributors—
qua subjects making sense of their social environments. Like nutritiousness and color (mutatis 
mutandis), attitudes of belief exist only in relation to organisms who have evolved to interact with 
their social environments by way of the attribution of belief. To believe that a mug contains hot 
coffee is to function, as an object in a social environment, to be attributed the belief that a mug 
contains hot coffee. Functioning in this way is a matter of having an appropriately interpretable 
pattern of dispositions to act, react, think, and feel: that is, a pattern of dispositions which the 
belief attributor would recognize as constitutive of belief.16 
 Paramechanists assume that attitudes of belief function as cogs in the cognitive systems 
of believers. This assumption is mistaken. Attitudes of belief do not contribute directly to the 
cognitive operations of the believers to whom they are attributed.17 Cognitive states of belief (if 
they exist) do that productive causal work. Attitudes of belief, by contrast, function as 
characteristics of believers (including the belief attributor herself) in attributor-relative social 
environments. 
 Diverse styles of belief and intersubjective indeterminacy pose problems for 
paramechanists who take all beliefs to be intrinsic characteristics of believers, but not for 
interpretivists who refuse to conflate attitudes of belief with cognitive states of belief. Despite 
their disparate cognitive states, Mo, Delia, and Roger share the attitude of belief that there is coffee 
in the mug, insofar as they all live in ways that sufficiently fit the general-purpose model of that 
belief wielded by a belief attributor. And, as mentioned, interpretivists afford themselves the 
flexibility to account for—or dismiss—intersubjective indeterminacy in any of several ways. 
 
15 Elsewhere (Curry forthcoming b), I have argued that dispositionalists are ipso facto interpretivists, so I 
will henceforth restrict my discussion to interpretivism. 
16 In other publications, I have defended and fleshed out other aspects of this interpretivist account of belief 
(Curry 2018, 2020, forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and proposed an analogous interpretivist account of 
intelligence (Curry forthcoming c, forthcoming d). 
17 Attitudes of belief do, of course, contribute indirectly to cognitive operations. The bolt of self-knowledge 
that accompanies self-attributing the belief that one’s job sucks might lead one to quit. 
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Dennett embraces (rare and practically insignificant) objective indeterminacy; Davidson insists 
that what somebody believes is objectively and intersubjectively determined by the principle of 
charity; Baker and Mölder advert to empirically informed common sense to resolve any apparent 
indeterminacy. My ecological interpretivism embraces the intersubjective indeterminacy of 
attitudes of belief while denying that there is any objective indeterminacy about what somebody 
believes. Ella objectively believes one thing for Jones and objectively believes another thing for 
Brown. 
Interpretivists thus dodge the concerns about multiple realizability, externalism, and 
intersubjective indeterminacy that plague paramechanical versions of the identity theory, 
computational functionalism, and personal functionalism. But another popular version of the 
view that attitudes of belief are theoretically posited cogs in cognitive systems—paramechanical 
teleofunctionalism (Millikan 1984; Lycan 1987; Dretske 1988; Sterelny 1990b; Papineau 1993; 
Burge 2010; Neander 2017)—dodges these concerns almost as deftly. Happily, however, a critical 
discussion of how teleofunctionalism dodges these concerns will serve both to condemn its 




 The central tenet of teleofunctionalism is that beliefs (and other content-bearing mental 
states) have irreducibly normative functions. According to paramechanical teleofunctionalists, 
beliefs evolved—and, in individual believers, develop—to be cogs in cognitive systems that serve 
representational and inferential purposes. 
 
4.1 Paramechanical teleofunctionalism about belief 
 Whereas interpretivism is the theory that attitudes of belief are patterns of dispositions 
that belief attributors identify with taking the world to be some way, paramechanical 
teleofunctionalism is the theory that attitudes of belief are cognitive states that serve to make 
representations of believers’ environments available for cognitive processing. The dominant, 
etiological form of teleofunctionalism dictates that beliefs have been naturally selected to serve 
the purposes played by believers’ cognitive systems.  
Teleofunctionalism differs from other functionalisms by placing an emphasis on the 
biological (as opposed to computational or pure dispositional) functions played by beliefs. As 
Elliot Sober quipped, teleofunctionalists put “the function back into functionalism” (1985: 175). 
Computational roles and dispositions are not usually described in normative terms; instead, the 
functionalists discussed in §3 make descriptive claims about how beliefs function to transform 
inputs into outputs. Teleofunctionalists, on the other hand, make irreducibly normative claims 
about how beliefs are supposed to function, given their evolutionary (and developmental) 
etiology. An attitude or cognitive state has a teleofunction insofar as it is constitutively aimed at 
fulfilling a biological purpose of an organism. 
According to Ruth Millikan’s influential etiological teleofunctionalism, beliefs are evolved 
cognitive means by which organisms assimilate information from their environments and figure 
out how to behave accordingly. Millikan writes that “the categories of intentional psychology are 
function categories in the biologist’s sense of ‘function’, taking this to be a sense in which function 
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is determined by evolutionary history rather than by current dispositions” (1993: 171). What 
beliefs you have does not depend solely on the current computational (or personal functional) 
architecture of your cognitive system; it depends on the naturally teleological etiology of the 
mechanisms and cognitive states that system comprises. 
 
This means that categories such as belief … are biological-function categories—very broad 
and general ones, of course. Compare the categories limb, hormone, circulatory system, 
eye, visual system, etc. More contentious, the claim includes that such categories or types 
as belief-that-it-is-raining … are carved out with reference to biological functions. (1993: 
172–173)18 
 
In particular, for Millikan, “one of [belief]’s proper functions is to participate in inferences in such 
a manner as to help produce fulfillment of desires” (1993: 71). A believer has the belief-that-it-is-
raining insofar as she has a cognitive state that was selected for the dual purposes of affirming 
the proposition that it is raining and enabling the believer to make useful inferences therefrom. 
Paramechanical teleofunctionalism apparently avoids the problems with multiple 
realizability and intersubjective indeterminacy faced by paramechanical identity theorists, 
computational functionalists, and personal functionalists. Mo, Delia, and Roger share the same 
teleofunctional cognitive state of belief that the mug contains hot coffee, insofar as their respective 
computational (or dispositional) states all serve the same proper purpose. (Each of the café 
denizens’ computational states also serves other purposes, teleofunctionally grounding other 
beliefs, but their respective cognitive states of belief that the mug contains hot coffee are all 
individuated by virtue of this shared purpose, abstracting away from implementational 
differences.) And paramechanical teleofunctionalists can take Ella to have a single, 
intersubjectively determinate attitude of belief by appealing neither to Ella’s current cognitive 
architecture nor to intersubjective agreement, but to the evolutionary history of Ella’s cognitive 
state. Jones and Brown both know how Ella actually functions, but the crucial question for the 
 
18 Millikan adds: “(though, in the case of beliefs, not directly according to function)” (1993: 173). This is 
because “being a little more precise, it is the belief-forming mechanisms that produce the adaptations, the 
adjustments, of the organism to the environment, the beliefs. Beliefs themselves are functionally classified, 
are “individuated,” not directly by function but according to the special conditions corresponding to them 
that must be met in the world if it is to be possible for them to contribute to proper functioning of the larger 
system in a historically normal way” (189). For Millikan, belief-forming mechanisms and belief-consuming 
mechanisms are selected for teleofunctions, whereas beliefs are individuated on the basis of their ability—
read: systemic capacity function (Cummins 1975)—to aid in the proper functioning of these cognitive 
mechanisms. This nuance of Millikan’s teleofunctionalism does not impugn my analysis. For one thing, the 
idea of attitude-of-belief-forming- and attitude-of-belief-consuming-mechanisms is dubious precisely 
because we ought not conflate attitudes of belief with cognitive states of belief. Moreover, if my arguments 
are good, then insofar as it does make sense to speak of attitude-of-belief-forming-mechanisms, these 
mechanisms must be taken to include the social mindshaping forces detailed below. And insofar as it makes 
sense to speak of attitude-of-belief-consuming mechanisms, these mechanisms must be taken to include 
the belief attribution practices detailed below. Thus, if my arguments are good, then a follower of Millikan 
should take the mechanisms that form and consume cognitive states to have distinct proper functions from 
the mechanisms that form and consume attitudes. 
Please cite published version 
 
18 
teleofunctionalist is how she properly ought to function. If Jones’s amateur evolutionary 
psychology is on the right track, then Ella’s belief is anti-suicidal. Otherwise, Ella’s attitude of 
belief is suicidal.19 Either way, there is a single intersubjectively determinate fact about what Ella 
believes, as determined by the proper biological (rather than actual subpersonal or personal) 
function of Ella’s cognitive state of belief.20 
 I previously emphasized dissociations between attitudes of belief and intrinsic cognitive 
states, analogous to the dissociations between perceivable colors and SSRs. In order to argue 
against paramechanical teleofunctionalism, I am going to exploit another dimension of the 
analogy between beliefs and colors. Just as colors co-evolved with organisms’ capacities to see 
color, attitudes of belief co-evolved with organisms’ capacities to attribute beliefs. Insofar as 
etiological teleofunctionalism is a theory of attitudes of belief as well as cognitive states of belief, 
teleofunctionalists ought to differentiate between the teleofunctions of the former and the 
teleofunctions of the latter. And insofar as it assigns distinct teleofunctions to attitudes of belief 
and cognitive states of belief, teleofunctionalism becomes a version of (rather than 
paramechanical rival to) my ecological interpretivism about attitudes of belief. 
 I am therefore not going to argue against teleofunctionalism, though I have reservations 
(especially about its etiological incarnations).21 Instead, I am going to argue that committed 
teleofunctionalists should give up on their paramechanism: they should uphold the distinction 
between attitudes of belief and cognitive states of belief while being teleofunctionalists about 
both. My argument will hinge on questioning paramechanical assumptions about the functional 
roles attitudes of belief evolved to play, and whose purposes they evolved to serve. Attitudes of 
belief do not primarily serve believers; they did not evolve to be cogs in cognitive systems that 
properly function to help believers transform inputs into outputs and move around their 
environments. On the contrary, attitudes of belief evolved in tandem with belief attribution 
capacities, just as perceivable colors evolved in tandem with visual systems. If attitudes of belief 
have distinctive proper functions, then they properly function within the social environments of 
 
19 The notion that Ella’s belief that she ought to kill herself plays a selected-for proper function is decidedly 
off-kilter. For interesting discussion of maladaptive (as well as selectively inert) beliefs, see Morgan (1883) 
and Peacocke (1992), as well as Millikan’s (2000) response.  
20 Fodor (1992) has influentially argued that teleofunctionalism faces a different kind of indeterminacy 
worry, which he terms ‘the disjunction problem’: there is no way of saying whether a frog’s belief is there 
is a fly, or there is a bug, or there is a small black object. Sterelny (1990: 125–127) provides an externalistic 
response to the disjunction problem, and Neander (2017) addresses it with reference to empirical findings 
about toad fly-detection capacities. 
21 My general reservations concerning etiological teleofunctionalism are articulated by Paul Sheldon Davies 
(2001, 2009), and my specific reservations concerning etiological teleofunctionalism about the individuation 
of belief are articulated by Sober (1985) and Sterelny (1990: 128–137). Note that, due to these reservations, 
the central argument of this section is conditional in form. If one is a teleofunctionalist, then they ought to 
be an interpretivist about attitudes of belief too. If one is not a teleofunctionalist, then the arguments of the 
previous sections ought to have already convinced them of interpretivism about attitudes of belief. This 
section should, nevertheless, be of interest to all readers, insofar as exploring the evolutionary history and 
present functions of everyday belief attribution adds plausibility and detail to my ecological interpretivism 
(regardless of whether one buys teleofunctionalism as a principle for individuating beliefs). 
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belief attributors, as means by which attributors regulate (McGeer 2007), manipulate (Malle 2004), 
predict (Dennett 1998), explain (Andrews 2012), and (ethically, aesthetically, epistemically, and 
pragmatically) evaluate whole patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. 
 
4.2. Against conflating attitudes with teleofunctional cognitive states 
Humans evolved not only to interact with inanimate objects in their environments, but 
also to interact with other minded organisms. In Tad Zawidzki's (2013: 233) words, “the most 
important features of most primate ecologies are social” in a sophisticated sense: they involve 
primates’ recognition of others as end-driven agents. Human social cognition comprises an 
especially sophisticated set of capacities that were made possible because humans evolved in 
especially rich social environments.22 Zawidzki calls this set of capacities the “human 
sociocognitive syndrome,” and takes it to include pervasive cooperation, language use, 
sophisticated mindshaping ability, and sophisticated mindreading ability.23 
Zawidzki calls mindreading “sophisticated” when it involves the explicit attribution of 
attitudes, as opposed to merely “some kind of appreciation of conspecifics’ [attitudes] … a kind of 
sensitivity to or ability to track at least some propositional attitudes” (2013: 13).24 To be able to 
mindread, in this sophisticated sense, is to be able to attribute attitudes of belief veridically. 
Though we do not know the precise evolutionary and cultural forces that have led to the belief 
attribution abilities of modern humans, we have good reason to believe that the capacity arose 
out of the selective pressures of our historical social environments. When you interact with people 
a lot, it is immensely useful to be able to figure out what they believe. Knowing that a dominant 
peer does not believe the food you crave exists can help you acquire much needed extra nutrients 
(Hare et al. 2000). For mothers, reliably attributing beliefs to other adults is crucial to figuring out 
who to trust to help rear vulnerable, slow-developing human babies (Hrdy 2009). More generally, 
being able to figure out what weird things our conspecifics believe allows us to offer satisfactory 
explanations of their anomalous behavior (Andrews 2012: 224–230). Similarly, attributing beliefs 
to ourselves—and telling our friends what we believe—helps us portray our own behavior as 
rational and responsible (Malle, Knobe & Nelson 2007). Zawidzki argues that “our ancestors first 
started attributing full-blown propositional attitudes … to rehabilitate status in the wake of 
apparently counternormative behavior, especially apparent reneging on explicit commitments” 
 
22 Other proponents of the importance of social environments in human evolution who have been 
influential on my thinking include Tomasello (1999), Hrdy (2009), Apperly (2011), Andrews (2012), Sterelny 
(2012), Chase (2013) and Heyes (2018). 
23 Many theorists countenance these four capacities as (at least nigh) uniquely human. There is, however, 
no consensus about which of these capacities emerged first in the history of human evolution. Many 
psychologists and philosophers take mindreading to have led to the other abilities, but Zawidzki argues 
that mindshaping is “our sociocognitive linchpin” (2013: 1). Sterelny (2012) and Heyes (2018) rally against 
the idea of any single magic bullet.  
24 Although he stresses that the point of sophisticated mindreading is not to identify cognitive states (2013: 
237), Zawidzki nevertheless fails to question the paramechanical assumption that attitudes of belief do 
happen to be “concrete, unobservable causes of behavior” (2013: 11). This leads him to endorse a Dennettian 
interpretivism about the targets of unsophisticated mindreading while retaining certain paramechanistic 
assumptions about the attitudes of belief attributed in sophisticated mindreading. 
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(2013: 224). All in all, the ability to attribute beliefs was plainly adaptive in our ancestral social 
environments. 
Being mindreadable was adaptive too. If you think, feel, act, and react in patterns that 
belief attributors can latch onto, then you are more likely to be trusted with precious food, babies, 
and promises. Developing understandable (and nonthreatening) patterns of dispositions is 
crucial to being admitted into human societies in which your conspecifics have your back. 
Crucially, though, these attitudes of belief help believers out only insofar as they render them 
more intelligible in the eyes of belief attributors (including the believer herself).  
These mutually reinforcing adaptive benefits—of the capacity to attribute beliefs and the 
propensity to live in patterns understandable as beliefs—led to an evolutionary ratchet effect. 
Sophisticated ‘mindshaping’ (Mameli 2001) comprises a set of practices including imitation, 
pedagogy, conformity to norms, and narrative self-constitution. What these practices have in 
common is that they function to make patterns of behavior more homogenous across a 
population. In other words, mindshaping delimits the patterns of dispositions to act, react, think, 
and feel that normal members of a community are likely to have. On Zawidzki's account, 
sophisticated mindshaping made the evolution of sophisticated mindreading possible. In order 
to veridically attribute beliefs to other members of their social environments, humans had to first 
use mindshaping techniques to construct those environments such that beliefs would manifest 
themselves as understandable—if sometimes aberrant—patterns of behaviors, thoughts, and 
feelings. The capacity to attribute beliefs in turn helped people regulate, manipulate, predict, 
explain, and evaluate the particular thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of their peers, on the basis 
of these patterns, which allowed for ever more sophisticated imitation, pedagogy, conformity, 
and narrative self-constitution practices. Through this more sophisticated mindshaping, humans 
developed more refined, more normalized, and thus more predictable, attitudes of belief. 
Attitudes of belief and mindreading abilities therefore (both biologically and culturally) co-
evolved. 
Zawidzki’s theory of the evolution of social cognition suggests that attitudes of belief were 
naturally selected in virtue of the functional roles they play in mindreaders’ social environments. 
It was adaptive for our ancestors to be attributed beliefs (and judged favorably on account of 
those beliefs), just as it was adaptive to attribute beliefs veridically. In Millikan’s terms, attitudes 
of belief have the proper function of enabling belief attribution, which in turn has the proper 
function of helping belief attributors predict, explain, regulate, and evaluate the thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors of believers. To believe that it is raining is to have a pattern of dispositions 
demarcated by the teleofunction of enabling sophisticated mindreaders to attribute the belief that 
it is raining to you.  
The natural selection of stable attitudes of belief—qua patterns of dispositions to act, react, 
think, and feel—inevitably involved the alteration of cognitive states of believers. Dispositions to 
act, react, think and feel are, after all, ontologically dependent on the cognitive systems that 
enable organisms to act, react, think, and feel. Nevertheless, it is not cognitive states of believers 
that were selected for when mindshaping practices made it increasingly adaptive to behave, 
think, and feel similarly to everybody else. Successful mindreaders pick up on attitudes of belief 
qua patterns that fit their models of belief, not qua cognitive states underlying those patterns. It 
is thus mindreadable (rather than purely functional) patterns of dispositions that fulfill the 
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teleofunction of enabling mindreading. 
Consider the analogy with the evolution of color perception. As mentioned, there is good 
evidence that primate trichromacy co-evolved with the colors of the fruits that primates eat. It 
was adaptive for trichromatic primates to locate nutritious fruits, and it was adaptive for colorful-
fruit-bearing plants to disperse their seeds via primate digestive systems. This co-evolution 
inevitably involved the alteration of the intrinsic physicochemical properties and SSRs of fruits. 
But those physicochemical properties and SSRs were not selected for. The properties of the fruits 
that were selected for were their perceivable colors, because perceivable colors are the properties 
that serve the teleofunction of enabling color perceivers to locate fruits (and thereby disperse their 
seeds). 
The moral of this evolutionary fable is that, because colors exist for the purpose of being 
seen, they cannot be reduced to invisible physicochemical properties of colored objects. Indeed, it 
is not any non-relational property of fruits, but the way fruits look red to primates that conferred a 
selective advantage. Perceivable colors are for color perceivers—they exist in order to be seen by 
creatures like us—and it is only through being for perceivers that they help plants disperse their 
seeds. 
Analogously, on an account that blends interpretivism and teleofunctionalism about 
belief, attitudes of belief are patterns of dispositions to act, react, think, and feel that were selected 
for the teleofunction of making people recognizable as believers to belief attributors. There are no 
perceivable colors without (at least historical) color perceivers, and there are no attitudes of belief 
without (at least historical) belief attributors. Attitudes of belief are for belief attributors—they 
exist in order to be grasped by creatures like us—and it is only through being for attributors that 
they help believers navigate their social environments. 
There might be cognitive states of belief with the teleofunctions assigned to them by 
philosophers like Millikan. But if such cognitive states of belief exist, they plausibly acquired their 
etiological teleofunctions long before belief attribution capacities and attitudes of belief co-
evolved. Humans (or their ancestors) had need of cognitive states serving representational and 
inferential purposes, to help them interact with their environments, long before they developed 
sophisticated social cognition. The two varieties of belief have distinct proper functions, and thus 
deserve distinct teleofunctional analyses. Whereas cognitive states of belief fulfill (or fail to fulfill) 
their teleofunctions within the proprietary cognitive systems of believers, attitudes of belief fulfill 
(or fail to fulfill) their teleofunctions within the social environments of belief attributors. 
Committed teleofunctionalists should therefore reject paramechanism in favor of a 
teleofunctional version of interpretivism about attitudes of belief (while, if they like, retaining 
their classic teleofunctionalism about cognitive states of belief).25 
Cognitive states of belief may hew closely to attitudes of belief. Indeed, the evolution of 
 
25 It might be objected that attitudes of belief function to give attributors a grip on the cognitive functioning 
of believers. Attitudes of belief can function, in part, to give attributors a loose, indirect grip on the cognitive 
functioning of believers. But I reject the implication that attitudes of belief can therefore unproblematically 
be conflated with cognitive states of belief. After all, perceivable colors can function, in part, to give 
perceivers a grip on how objects reflect light. (Seeing that my mug is blue gives me a loose, indirect grip on 
the fact that it reflects more light at the lower end of the visual spectrum.) Nevertheless, perceivable colors 
cannot be unproblematically conflated with SSRs.  
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mindreadable attitudes of belief may have (contingently) depended on attitudes of belief coming 
to weakly supervene on cognitive states of belief, such that, given the course of cognitive 
evolutionary history, believers with the same cognitive states could not have different attitudes 
of belief. Fred Dretske has argued that beliefs weakly supervene on brain states via an analogy 
with how monetary value weakly supervenes on the physical properties of coins and bills. The 
sociohistorical etiology of money guarantees the latter supervenience relation—”thanks to the 
government's efforts, every piece of paper that has a particular set of intrinsic properties is a 
genuine $20 bill” (2000: 269). Dretske proposes that the phylogenetic and ontogenetic etiology of 
beliefs analogously guarantees the contingent but complete supervenience of the mind on the 
brain. One could run a very similar argument for the weak supervenience of attitudes of belief on 
cognitive states of belief.26 Especially if cognitive states of belief were pitched at the personal level 
(á la Pettit and Jackson 1990) and non-etiologically teleofunctionally individuated (á la Sterelny 
1990a), this argument might be persuasive. I thus will not argue that attitudes of belief cannot be 
given a reductive analysis in terms of cognitive states of belief. Instead, I have argued that 
attitudes ought not be conflated with cognitive states. But reducibility should not be assumed 
either, given how little is currently known about cognitive architecture, as well as the even 
murkier question of how attributor-relative aspects of mind are coordinated with intrinsic aspects 
of mind. 
Whether attitudes of belief weakly supervene on cognitive states of belief is an open 
empirical question. At the other extreme, eliminativists have long stressed that it is an open 
empirical question whether cognitive states of belief exist at all. If it turns out that there is nothing 
to be found in human cognitive systems resembling (much less supervened upon by) attitudes of 
belief, then we should be eliminativists about cognitive states of belief. Nevertheless, the attitudes 
of belief that play functional roles in the social environments of belief attributors will remain 
ontologically unscathed. If it turns out that attitudes of belief do weakly supervene on cognitive 
states of belief, then functionalists will be vindicated in their realism about cognitive states of 
belief. But they will not be vindicated in their paramechanism. Weak supervenience does not 
amount to type-identity (Haugeland 1982). Functionalists type-identify beliefs via functions, and 
attitudes of belief play different functions (in different systems) than cognitive states of belief. 
Socially primitive creatures living in a world without belief attributors could have evolved 
cognitive states of belief, but it would have been impossible for them to evolve attitudes of belief. 
Indeed, assigning distinct teleofunctions to attitudes and cognitive states restores the 
double dissociation between the two. Cognitive states of belief that have evolved to serve 
representational and inferential teleofunctions plausibly multiply realize attitudes of belief that 
serve teleofunctions of rendering people recognizable as believers. Moreover, believers with 
intersubjectively determinate cognitive states of belief can have intersubjectively indeterminate 
attitudes of belief, since they can have distinct attitudes with teleofunctions serving the distinct 
purposes of different belief attributors. 
 
26 Dretske makes a distinction between behavior and bodily movement and argues that beliefs cause 
behavior whereas the brain states they weakly supervene on cause bodily movement. Depending on how 
it goes, an argument for the weak supervenience of attitudes of belief on cognitive states of belief might 
entail that whereas cognitive states of belief cause behavior, attitudes of belief render that behavior suitable 
for folk explanation, prediction, regulation, and evaluation. 
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Readers who are uneasy with just-so evolutionary explanations of psychological traits 
need not be alarmed by the adaptationist bent of the preceding discussion. We can see who color 
and belief are for without reference to evolutionary history. Right now, somewhere in the Blue 
Ridge Mountains, a berry is being eaten by a bear—leading to the dispersal of its seeds—because 
of its vibrant color. The functional role of the color is to signal EAT ME! to the bear. Analogously, 
when we attribute the belief that the mug contains hot coffee to Mo, Delia, and Roger, we are not 
speculating about the trio’s respective cognitive architectures. We are making sense of, and 
coming to terms with, their complex patterns of thoughts, feelings, actions, and reactions. The 
functional role of these patterns is to signal I TAKE THE MUG TO CONTAIN HOT COFFEE! to 
themselves and other belief attributors. Likewise, the question of what Ella believes matters to 
Brown and Jones: they are trying to figure out how to intervene, on the basis of whether or not 
she believes she should kill herself. They are not speculating about what productively causes her 
to act—by stipulation, they agree about that. Instead, they are arguing about how best to 
characterize her in terms of belief, so that they can lend a helping hand more effectively. 
Teleofunctionalists ought not conflate attitudes of belief with cognitive states of belief; the 
former emerge within belief attribution practices, whereas the latter emerge within (etiological or 
systemic) analyses of cognitive systems. By refusing to conflate attitudes with cognitive states, 
philosophers can provide a rigorous account of the former that is invulnerable to revision at the 
whim of ephemeral trends in theories of cognitive architecture. Identity theorists, computational 
functionalists, commonsense functionalists, teleofunctionalists, and eliminativists about 
cognitive states of belief should all agree that attitudes of belief are patterns of living that play 
functional roles in belief attributors’ social environments. Pace recent paramechanical critiques 
(Crane 2016; Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018), interpretivism complements the cognitive 
scientific study of belief, just as relationalism complements the physical study of color. 
 
5. Interpretivism all the way down? 
 I have argued that attitudes of belief emerge in relation to interpretation, and must 
therefore be distinguished from any intrinsic cognitive states of belief posited by cognitive 
scientists. I have not yet discussed the more radical possibility that cognitive states of belief 
themselves are not intrinsic characteristics of believers—that is, that cognitive states of belief, like 
attitudes of belief, emerge in relation to interpretation. Perhaps cognitive states of belief emerge 
relative to philosophers and scientists’ theoretically motivated belief attribution practices, in 
much the same manner as attitudes of belief emerge relative to folks’ socially motivated belief 
attribution practices. Philosophers of various persuasions might find this claim plausible due to 
their specific commitments about the nature of belief, or due to a more general commitment to 
interpretivism about the mental (á la Mölder 2010) or to perspectivism about functional 
individuation (á la Cummins 1983 or Craver 2007) or to perspectivism about all scientific kinds 
(á la Kuhn 1962 or Giere 2010).27 
 The possibility that cognitive states of belief are themselves interpretation-dependent 
does not necessarily obviate the distinction between attitudes of belief and cognitive states of 
 
27 Lee and Dewhurst (2021) offer an illuminating discussion of the relationship between interpretivism 
(spelled out in terms of Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’) and perspectivisms about mechanistic explanation. 
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belief. After all, the theoretical motivations that drive scientists’ belief attribution practices might 
be sufficiently different from the social motivations that drive folks’ belief attribution practices to 
make it such that the cognitive states of belief that emerge in relation to the former are importantly 
distinct from the attitudes of belief that emerge in relation to the latter. As mentioned at the outset 
of this article, there is good reason to doubt that folks ordinarily construe beliefs as inner causes 
that produce behavior. But that is precisely how many cognitive scientists construe beliefs. Thus, 
even if they are interpretation-dependent, cognitive states are plausibly individuated with 
respect to the functional role that they purportedly play within a cognitive system (which itself 
may be individuated in relation to cognitive scientists’ perspectives and explanatory aims)—and 
can be empirically discovered to exist, or not, via investigations into whether the cognitive system 
functions in the theorized manner. In contrast, as I argued in §4, attitudes of belief are 
individuated with respect to the role they play (not in the believer’s cognitive system but) in the 
social environment of the belief attributor. Given this core difference in how cognitive states of 
belief and attitudes of belief are individuated—which holds even if both varieties of belief emerge 
in relation to interpretation—the distinction between them strikes me as iron-clad.  
 Nevertheless, I will not pretend to have settled the issue of whether it would make 
practical sense to continue to distinguish cognitive states of belief from attitudes of belief if one 
were to accept the more radical claim that all believing is interpretation-dependent. Instead, I will 
be content noting that I do take myself to have shown that the distinction between cognitive states 
of belief and attitudes of belief is extremely useful within our present intellectual environment in 
which many philosophers and scientists remain committed to the existence of non-interpretation-
dependent beliefs as central theoretical posits in cognitive science. Determining whether 
cognitive states of belief—if they exist—are intrinsic or interpretation-dependent is a tall order. It 
implicates old, vexed debates about the mind-body problem, the relation of mind to world, 
natural kinds, natural teleology, and the theory-ladenness of science, as well as newer vexed 
debates about cognitive architecture, mechanistic explanation, and the explanatory scope of 
cognitive science. Those debates have not been settled in this article. If they are eventually settled 
in a manner that supports both the existence and the interpretation-dependence of cognitive 
states of belief, then it is possible that my distinction between attitudes and cognitive states will 
have been obviated (my remarks in the previous paragraph notwithstanding). 
As those debates currently stand, however, many philosophers remain convinced that 
cognitive states of belief are intrinsic characteristics of believers (perhaps with some important 
characteristics derived from their etiology). Jerry Fodor once wrote that if something like this 
were not “literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false and it's the 
end of the world” (Fodor 1989: 77). In this article, I have argued that if Fodor (or Jackson and 
Pettit, or Millikan, or any other philosopher who posits non-interpretation-dependent cognitive 
states of belief) is correct about cognitive states of belief, then they ought not conflate them with 
attitudes of belief. Rather, all philosophers should be ecological interpretivists about attitudes of 
belief, no matter their views about the beliefs invoked in cognitive science, just as all philosophers 
should be relationalists about perceivable color, no matter their views about the colors invoked 
in the physics of light. Even if it does not hold fast in the end, the working distinction between 
attitudes of belief and cognitive states of belief is, at present, indispensable as a means of guiding 
everybody to the truth about the beliefs we human beings attribute to each other in everyday life. 




This article had a long adolescence. I first developed the analogy between belief and color in a 
term paper for a 2013 graduate seminar on Evolution and Perception led by Gary Hatfield. That 
term paper became the seed for my doctoral dissertation on the metaphysics of belief, which I 
defended in 2018 under Hatfield’s supervision. Despite the fact that its earliest ancestor was the 
first piece of the dissertation to fall into place, the present article is the last direct descendent of 
the dissertation that I expect to appear in print as a standalone article. Along the way, it has been 
reworked and sharpened through feedback from audiences at the University of Pennsylvania, 
Kenyon College, The College of Wooster, Utica College, West Virginia University, and the 2014 
Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Vancouver, and especially through 
conversations with Kristin Andrews, Ben Baker, Marie Barnett, Justin Bernstein, Ned Block, Brett 
Calcott, Liz Camp, David Cerbone, David Chalmers, Jonathan Cohen, Amelia Curry, David 
Curry, Louise Daoust, Dan Dennett, Karen Detlefsen, Zoltan Domotor, Alkistis Elliott-Graves, 
Steve Esser, Marth Farah, Lindsey Fiorelli, Daniel Fryer, Geoff Georgi, Kurt Gerry, Peter Godfrey-
Smith, Nabeel Hamid, Gary Hatfield, David Hoinski, Brian Huss, Karen Kovaka, Susan Sauvé 
Meyer, Lisa Miracchi, Thomas Noah, Emily Parke, Hal Parker, Jay Peters, Charles Phillips, Pierce 
Randall, Brian Reese, Sharon Ryan, Carlos Santana, Dan Singer, Jordan Taylor, Garret Thomson, 
Michael Weisberg, and Rob Willison. Many thanks to all of the aforementioned, to those I've 
failed to mention, and to several anonymous reviewers, including reviewers for Synthese who 
provided particularly generous comments. 
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